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Abstract 
Introduction: The first detected case in Lebanon on 21 February 2020 engendered implementation of a nationwide 
lockdown alongside timely contact-tracing and testing.
Objectives: Our study aims to calculate the serial interval of SARS-CoV-2 using contact tracing data collected 21 
February to 30 June 2020 in Lebanon to guide testing strategies.
Methods: rRT-PCR positive COVID-19 cases reported to the Ministry of Public Health Epidemiological Surveillance 
Program (ESU-MOH) are rapidly investigated and identified contacts tested. Positive cases and contacts assigned into 
chains of transmission during the study time-period were verified to identify those symptomatic, with non-missing 
date-of-onset and reported source of exposure. Selected cases were classified in infector–infectee pairs. We calculated 
mean and standard deviation for the serial interval and best distribution fit using AIC criterion.
Results: Of a total 1788 positive cases reported, we included 103 pairs belonging to 24 chains of transmissions. Most 
cases were Lebanese (98%) and male (63%). All infectees acquired infection locally. Mean serial interval was 5.24 days, 
with a standard deviation of 3.96 and a range of − 4 to 16 days. Normal distribution was an acceptable fit for our non-
truncated data.
Conclusion: Timely investigation and social restriction measures limited recall and reporting biases. Pre-symptomatic 
transmission up to 4 days prior to symptoms onset was documented among close contacts. Our SI estimates, in line 
with international literature, provided crucial information that fed into national contact tracing measures. Our study, 
demonstrating the value of contact-tracing data for evidence-based response planning, can help inform national 
responses in other countries.
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Introduction
Since its initial designation as a public health event 
of international concern on January 30, 2020 and as 
a pandemic on March 11, 2020 by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) [1], COVID-19—the dis-
ease caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)—pushed countries 
worldwide to implement a range of public health and 
social measures to limit virus spread and break trans-
mission chains. Such measures, relying mainly on 
physical distancing, ranged from partial or full clo-
sures of retail, recreational, educational, work, and 
religious institutions and implementation of interna-
tional or domestic travel restrictions. By the end of 
March 2020, over a hundred countries worldwide were 
on partial or full lockdown [2]. To improve under-
standing of COVID-19 epidemiological, clinical, and 
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virological characteristics, WHO initiated the First 
Few X cases and contacts (FFX) investigation proto-
col, aiming to identify transmission dynamics, severity, 
and clinical spectrum. FFX allows description of clini-
cal presentation and severity, as well as estimation of 
serial interval, secondary infection rate (SIR), and the 
proportion of symptomatic cases [3].
In Lebanon, the first COVID-19 case was detected on 
February 21 2020 in a symptomatic passenger return-
ing on a flight from Iran. Subsequently, passengers 
returning from countries with clusters or sustained 
local transmission were screened for symptoms at the 
airport and land crossings and followed-up daily for 
the next 14 days. Travelers developing symptoms were 
referred for testing using real-time Reverse Transcrip-
tion Polymerase Chain Reaction (rRT-PCR) at Rafik 
Hariri University Hospital (RHUH). Decisions on pub-
lic health and social measures rapidly accelerated there-
after, with nurseries, schools and universities closed 
between February 29 and March 2, followed by closures 
of restaurants, cafés and night clubs on March 10 when 
the first confirmed COVID-19 death was declared. On 
March 11, as COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by 
WHO, Lebanon banned travel from 11 countries with 
local transmission. On March 15, the Council of Min-
isters and the Supreme Council of Defence declared 
a state of public health emergency imposing nation-
wide lockdown including closures of all ports of entry 
from March 16 [4]. On April 9, the national lockdown 
was extended until June 7. Lockdown measures were 
released in phases with the fifth and final phase target-
ing retail and recreational centres, which were given 
official permission to reopen on June 8 (with reduced 
capacity) and international flights, which resumed 
on July 1 (with 10% operational capacity compared to 
2019) [5].
In the context of novel infectious pathogens, under-
standing transmission dynamics and parameters is 
crucial to better implementation of control and miti-
gation strategies. Examples of such parameters include 
the incubation period (i.e. time between exposure and 
onset of symptoms), generation time (i.e. time between 
the point when the infector is infected and then infects 
someone), serial interval (i.e. time between symptoms 
onset of an infector and that of an infectee), and repro-
duction number (i.e. average number of infections 
generated by an infectious individual) [6]. These param-
eters are critical for improving implementation of case 
isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine periods. The 
aim of this study was to estimate the serial interval of 
SARS-CoV-2 in Lebanon using surveillance data col-
lected from the first few hundred cases and contacts in 
Lebanon as per the WHO FFX investigation protocol.
Methods
Case definitions
We used the COVID-19 case definition provided by 
Lebanese Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) circular 
no. 35, issued February 24, 2020, as ‘any person with any 
laboratory confirmation, including positive serology in 
paired serum samples, specific Polymerase Chain Reac-
tion (PCR), or genome sequencing, irrespective of clini-
cal signs and symptoms’ [7]. We also adopted the WHO 
case definition for close contact, as ‘any person who had 
direct physical or a close contact (within 1  m for more 
than 15  min) with a confirmed COVID-19 case; or any 
person providing direct care for patients with COVID-
19 disease without the proper use of personal protective 
equipment (PPE), from 2 days before to 14 days after the 
case’s onset of symptoms [8].
Data management
All private and public testing laboratories are requested 
to report confirmed COVID-19 cases daily to the Epide-
miological Surveillance Program at the Lebanese Min-
istry of Public Health (ESU-MOH). National data entry, 
initially performed by ESU-MOH central office using the 
electronic DHIS2 platform, is performed by testing labo-
ratories since September 2020. All confirmed cases were 
initially investigated using the FFX protocol “Case Initial 
Reporting Form A1” subsequently summarised as a two-
page case investigation form issued by ESU-MOH, col-
lecting similar information about socio-demographics, 
clinical signs and symptoms, contacts, and exposures in 
the 14 days prior to symptom onset. During the first few 
weeks of the national epidemic, all confirmed cases were 
isolated at Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH) in 
Beirut, until they tested negative twice using rRT-PCR. 
On March 30, an MOPH decree specified the duration of 
institutional or home isolation as 30 days from symptom 
onset for symptomatic cases and from date of confirma-
tion for asymptomatic cases (MOPH decree 359/1 dated 
March 30, 2020) [9]. On November 6, MOPH circular no. 
159 reduced self-isolation duration to 10 days for asymp-
tomatic and 13  days for symptomatic cases in line with 
WHO guidance.
ESU-MOH investigated identified close contacts, using 
FFX protocol Form B1 (Contact initial reporting form) 
to collect socio-demographic information, exposure his-
tory and symptoms onset, and followed them for 14 days 
from last encounter with the confirmed case using Form 
B2 (Contact follow-up reporting form). Initially, all con-
tacts were requested to home quarantine for 14 days and 
were tested on becoming symptomatic. From April 21, 
MOPH circular no. 73 requested all contacts be tested 
for COVID-19 once identified, regardless of symptoms. 
All symptomatic and asymptomatic cases and contacts 
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testing positive—and subsequently classified as cases—
were assigned to chains of transmission by ESU-MOH 
epidemiologists. Thus, the same chain of transmission 
can include infections acquired from household, occu-
pational (i.e. work settings other than hospitals) and 
healthcare exposure (i.e. between healthcare workers, or 
between patients and healthcare workers).
Constructing transmission pairs and calculating serial 
interval
For this study, we reviewed all cases reported to ESU-
MOH DHIS2 COVID-19 central database between 21 
February 2020 (i.e. detection of first case) and 30 June 
2020 (i.e. cluster transmission phase) and retained those 
meeting all the following criteria: (i) reported at least one 
symptom (i.e. fever, cough, dyspnea, headache, myalgia/
arthralgia, anosmia); (ii) provided a date of onset; and (iii) 
were linked to chains of transmission (i.e. non sporadic 
cases). Cases were excluded if they: (i) were asympto-
matic (no reported symptoms); (ii) were symptomatic but 
did not provide a date of onset; or (iii) their exposure was 
multi-factorial including several primary cases or expo-
sures. We reviewed transmission chains of retained cases 
by chronological order of exposure and symptoms onset 
to construct infector–infectee pairs as described by Xu 
et al. [10]. The ‘infector’ was defined as the primary case, 
with an identified source of exposure occurring prior to 
their encounter with the ‘infectee’ and presenting any 
symptoms. The ‘infectee’ was defined as the secondary 
case whose exposure was solely by the infector and pre-
senting any symptoms.
In the same chain of transmission, the same infector 
could generate more than one pair if they infected more 
than one individual. Additionally, the infectee from one 
pair could become an infector for another pair. Thus, to 
be conservative, pairs were discarded if the same onset 
date was reported by both the infector and infectee, as 
this was suggestive of an external unidentified source 
of infection. For every pair, the time difference between 
the date of symptom onset of the infectee and that of the 
infector was calculated as number of days. To estimate 
the serial interval, we used the likelihood-based estima-
tion method proposed by Wallinga and Teunis [11]. Con-
fidence intervals were generated with bootstrapping of 
1000 iterations. Analysis was conducted using R version 
4.0.3 and R studio version 1.2.5033 and distribution fit-
ting using fitdistrplus package.
Results
Between February 21 and June 30, 2020, a cumula-
tive number of 1788 confirmed COVID-19 cases were 
reported in Lebanon, which we screened for verification 
of source of exposure and onset date. We excluded 805 
asymptomatic cases, 302 symptomatic cases with missing 
date of onset, and 532 cases with multi-factorial exposure 
or multiple possible primary cases. Table 1 shows a total 
of 149 cases (62 infectors, 87 infectees) included. We 
obtained 103 infector–infectee pairs from 24 chains of 
transmission as per our selection criteria. Seventeen indi-
viduals were simultaneously considered as an infector in 
one pair and an infectee in another.
Table  2 shows no significant differences (p = 0.984) in 
the mean ages of infectors (50 ± 18.5 years) and infectees 
(45.3 ± 18.6 years). Most cases were Lebanese (98%) and 
male (63%). All infectees acquired the infection locally, as 
compared to 89% (n = 55) among infectors (p = 0.009).
For calculation of the serial interval from non-trun-
cated data, all 103 identified pairs were included in 
analysis. The empirical density distribution plot of the 
serial interval of non-truncated data is shown in Addi-
tional file  1. The mean serial interval fitted to the nor-
mal distribution was 5.24 days (95% CI 4.37–6.03), with 
a minimum of − 4 and a maximum of 16 days (Table 3). 
Skewness and kurtosis were calculated at 0.56 and 3.02, 
respectively. The Shapiro–Wilk normality test was cal-
culated at W = 0.962 (p-value = 0.005), implying the 
serial interval was merely normally distributed. Using 
maximum-likelihood estimation, the Akaike information 
Table 1 Distribution of cases as infector–infectee pairs
Number of pairs assigned 
to each infector











Table 2 Participant characteristics
Demographics Infector, n = 61 (%) Infectee, n = 87 (%) p-value
Age (mean years) 50 ± 18.5 45.3 ± 18.6 0.129
Sex
 Male 39 (63) 41 (46) 0.061
 Female 23 (37) 48 (54)
Nationality
 Lebanese 61 (98) 85 (98) 0.999
 Syrian 1 (2) 2 (2)
Source of infection
 Locally acquired 55 (89) 87 (100) 0.009
 Imported 7 (11) 0 (0)
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criterion (AIC) of the fitted non-truncated data to the 
normal distribution is calculated as 578.76.
Next, data analysis was repeated on truncated data 
after removing the six pairs with non-positive values of 
the serial interval. For the remaining 97 pairs, the mean 
serial interval fitted to the normal distribution was calcu-
lated at 5.68 days (95% CI 4.94–6.46). Skewness and kur-
tosis were calculated at 0.85 and 2.93, respectively. The 
Shapiro–Wilk normality test was calculated at W = 0.911 
(p-value = 1.01 ×  105). The Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) of the fitted truncated data to the normal distribu-
tion is calculated as 528.99.
Three other distributions were fitted to the non-
truncated data and their AIC evaluated: normal, log-
normal, Gamma and Weibull. Fitting the log-normal 
distribution to the non-truncated data, the fitted mean 
serial interval was estimated as 6.02 days (95% CI 5.06–
6.97), AIC = 504.83. The fitted mean was estimated at 
5.88 (95% CI 5.65–6.11), AIC = 501.56 from the Gamma 
distribution and at 5.78 (95% CI 5.56–6.01), AIC = 503.24 
for Weibull distribution. The empirical and theoretical 
density distribution plots of the serial interval of non-
truncated data are shown in Fig. 1.
Discussion
The serial interval estimates presented were computed 
using the first COVID-19 case data from Lebanon’s epi-
demic as reported to the national surveillance program. 
Our findings revealed estimates of 5.24  days (95% CI 
4.37–6.03) for complete data, and at 5.68  days (95% CI 
4.94–6.46) for truncated data between February 21 and 
June 30, 2020. Findings from both complete and trun-
cated data are in line with those found in the literature. 
A study conducted in China, outside Hubei province, 
estimated the mean SI 5.2 (± 4.7) days when rapid case 
identification and isolation measures were implemented, 
comparable to our SI estimates when similar COVID-19 
surveillance and response activities were implemented 
[12]. Another study in mainland China, covering Janu-
ary–February 2020, estimated SI as 5 (95% credible 
interval [CrI] 4.4–5.5) and 5.2 (95% CrI 4.9–5.7) days for 
household and non-household transmission respectively 
[10]. Further, a systematic review of 23 studies conducted 
between February and March 2020 estimated the mean 
SI between 4.2 to 7.5 days, with a pooled weighted mean 
estimate of 5.2 (95% CI 4.9–5.5) days [13]. Similarly, a sys-
tematic review of 11 studies conducted during the same 
period found a pooled estimate for SI as 5.40 (5.19, 5.61) 
and 5.19 (4.37, 6.02) days by the fixed and random effects 
model, respectively [14]. However, a study in Japan, using 
publicly-available data at the start of the pandemic, found 
the mean SI to be 4.7 (95% CrI 3.7, 6.0) days, which was 
slightly lower than reported estimates at the start of the 
epidemic in China possibly due to the small sample size 
limited to only 28 studied pairs of infector–infectees [15].
Though both complete and truncated data are reported 
in the literature, we do not think there is a valid reason 
Table 3 Summary statistics of fitted distributions for non-
truncated and truncated data
NB: AIC is Akaike information criterion
Data Distribution model Mean (95% CI) AIC
Non-truncated Normal (Mean, SD) 5.24 (4.37–6.03) 578.76
Truncated (> 0) Normal (Mean, SD) 5.68 (4.94–6.46) 528.99
Log-normal (mean-
log = 1.51, sdlog = 0.70)
6.02 (5.06–6.97) 504.83
Gamma
Shape = 2.44, rate = 0.43
5.88 (5.65–6.11) 501.56
Weibull
Shape = 1.65, Scale = 6.36
5.78 (5.56–6.01) 503.24
Fig. 1 Empirical and theoretical distribution plots of the serial interval of truncated data
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to exclude negative values from the data as this might 
exclude valuable information. Therefore, looking at our 
complete non-truncated data, we found that the normal 
distribution provides the best fit, which has also been 
used in other studies [10, 11, 14]. As documented else-
where, we consider that the normal distribution can be 
used with confidence for future epidemiological assess-
ment and modelling [10].
Interestingly, looking at our non-truncated data, a pre-
symptomatic transmission (i.e. where the infectee devel-
oped symptoms before the infector-primary case) was 
documented from 4 days before symptoms onset. Exami-
nation of the six pairs with negative serial interval values 
reveals these occurred in the same household, suggest-
ing that pre-symptomatic transmission can occur among 
close contacts [10, 12]. Our results align with those of a 
study of 468 confirmed cases in China reported in Feb-
ruary 2020 [16], and with the earliest recommendations 
of the WHO-FFX protocol that defines a contact as 
someone who was in contact with a positive case from 
1–4  days before symptom onset [3]. Nevertheless, the 
contact tracing procedures followed by MOPH Lebanon 
were built upon WHO considerations, defining contacts 
from 2 days before to 14 days after the case’s onset of ill-
ness [8].
The main strength of our study resides in the thorough 
contact tracing undertaken from detection of the first 
case in the country. The proportion of travel-acquired 
infections in our study sample was significantly higher 
among infectors (11.3%) as compared to infectee, in line 
with surveillance findings at national level during the 
same time-period, when community transmission was 
not yet established in the country. The study period, 
which corresponded with a country-wide lockdown and 
limited cluster transmission, minimized risk of reporting 
bias for possible sources of infection as was reflected by 
Nishiura et al. [16]. Additionally, the timely investigation 
of both cases and contacts reduced possible recall bias 
of the dates of symptoms onset, which was reported as a 
possible limitation in other studies [11].
This study is limited to estimating SI parameters in 
symptomatic cases. It would be useful to examine labora-
tory-confirmed asymptomatic cases both as infector and 
infectee and estimate whether generation time differs, 
to enable better understanding of disease transmission 
in such circumstances. However, this was not feasible 
in our study as the date of exposure was not systemati-
cally collected in case-based investigation forms. It would 
also have been interesting to estimate serial intervals 
for different demographic, geographic, or exposure (e.g. 
hospital, non-hospital setting) strata, but this was not 
feasible due to our limited sample size. Additionally, it 
would have been interesting to compare serial interval 
estimates at different phases of the epidemic as suggested 
by Ali et  al. [12], but this was not feasible as it became 
difficult to identify well-defined chains of transmission 
once Lebanon entered its community transmission phase 
in July 2020. Finally, it was not possible for us to conduct 
a sensitivity analysis with and without scenarios, multi-
factorial exposures, and multiple possible primary cases 
as the cases we excluded were missing the information 
pertinent for such an analysis.
Our study informed national policy, providing cru-
cial information that fed into contact-tracing measures 
adopted by Lebanon’s MOPH. For instance, alignment 
of our results with international findings and recom-
mendations influenced MOPH to recommend contacts 
be tested within 5–7  days from last exposure to a posi-
tive COVID-19 case instead of being tested immediately 
as was initially advised in April 2020. Thus, we believe 
our study can serve as an example for other countries 
to better understand transmission dynamic param-
eters and implement evidence-informed contact-tracing 
procedures.
Conclusion
Identifying the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 
is crucial for evidence-informed decision-making in 
controlling national COVID-19 epidemics. Our analysis 
of surveillance and investigation data collected on the 
first identified transmission chains in Lebanon guided 
national authorities in the implementation of contact 
tracing and testing, highlighting the necessity of testing 
contacts starting the 5th day after exposure rather than 
immediately upon identification.
Our study methods and findings can serve as a useful 
example on the importance of conducting contact trac-
ing to understand virus transmission dynamics and tailor 
response activities accordingly.
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